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THE BUSINESS SITUS OF CREDITS
By THOMAS

M ED PowELL*

When one man borrows money from another and promises to
pay him back, there commonly arises what we may colloquially
call a debt. The reason that it arises is that upon proper proceedings the lender can get a judgment against the borrower.
Some prefer to put the cart before the horse and to say that the
reason that the lender can get a judgment is that the transaction
has created a debt. One way of putting it may be as good as
another, so long as we know what we are talking about and understand that the nature of the transaction must be tested by its
results and therefore ex hypothesi must depend upon what those
results will be. Whenever after a lending-and-borrowing transaction we are justified in guessing that a court upon proper
demand will render a judgment, we are justified in believing
that a debt has arisen. But at bottom the existence of this debt
depends upon faith as to what some court will ultimately do.
If we proceed next to inquire where this debt is located, we
find scope for an analysis somewhere similar to that just applied
to its existence. In the simple case supposed, the only touchable
elements in the transaction are the borrower and the lender. We
put to one side the currency or what-not actually borrowed, because it may pass out of reach or out of existence. If the borrower and the lender are in different jurisdictions, where is the
debt located? If the essence of the debt is a faith that a court
*Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University, New York.
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will render a judgment, our task seems to be that of putting
salt on the tail of this faith. Whose faith counts most, that of
the borrower or that of the lender? The illimitable reaches of
such an inquiry are apparent. So we may as well stop before
we begin. If "location" implies existence in some special spot
of space, our simple debt is located nowhere. It isn't that kind
of animal. Any talk about its location is necessarily a medley of
metaphor and analogy. If we say that the debt is located in one
place or another, we can mean only that it can be dealt with as
though it were located in one place or another. Whatever fictitious "location" is thus assigned to a debt, the fiction and the
assignment are but devices for reaching results. For practical
purposes a debt may be regarded as being where it can be treated
as though it were. If we find a court treating a debt as though
it were in the pocket of the debtor or in the pocket of the creditor,
we may say that for the particular purpose in issue, the debt is
where it thus gets caught.
Yet we must not forget that any use of the term "location" in
this connection is fictional and metaphorical. If the term "situs"
means no more and no less than the term "location," it is as
fanciful to speak of the situs of a debt as to speak of its location.
Those who thus use "situs" must agree with Professor Beale that
"the true view would seem to be that a chose in action not being
corporeal has no situs for any purpose. "1 If, however, we take
"situs" as a verbal sign for the place where a debt or chose in
action may effectually be dealt with, then the taint of Ananias is
removed. For there are places in which debts and choses in action
are effectively dealt with. When" situs'"is thus used merely as a tag
for a result, we must avoid the vicious circle of also using the tag
as a reason for the result. We cannot eat our cake and have it too.
If we choose to say that a ciebt has its situs for garnishment whereever the debtor may be served with process for the reason that the
courts have in fact allowed it to be garnisheed wherever such service
is possible, we must forego the privilege of saying that a debt can
be garnisheed wherever the debtor may be served with process
1

"Summary of the Conflict of Laws," 3 CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1 ed.,

507. In "The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem To Compel Payment of a Debt." 27
HARv. L. REV. 108, 115 (December, 1913) Professor Beale puts the same idea as
follows:
"The true doctrine would seem to be that a debt has in fact no situs anywhere; not merely because it is intangible but because as a mere forced relation
between the parties it has no real existence anywhere." Cf. Mr. Justice Hughes in
Liverpool etc. Ins. Co. -. Board of Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 354, 31 Sup. Ct. 550
(1911) : "When it is said that intangible property, such as credits on open account,
have their situs at the creditor's domicil, the metaphor does not aid. Being incorporeal, they can have no actual situs. But they constitute property; as such they
must be regarded as taxable, and the question is one of Jurisdiction."
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for the reason that it has its situs wherever such service is possible.
If we choose to say that a debt has its situs for taxation at the
domicil of the creditor because that is where it can in fact be
taxed, we cannot say that it may be taxed there because that is
where it has its situs. "Situs" cannot be at one -and the same
time a way of stating results and the means of reaching them.
Such jolly little games of Ring-Around-the-Rosy have no proper
place in the law. We therefore confine our use of "situs" to the
results of judicial decisions. Since courts exist to reach results,
and not solely to indulge in metaphysical speculation, some things
are so because courts make them so. So a chose in action may
have a situs because the courts endow it with one.
That there is no such animal as the situs of a debt in rerum
natura is evident from the fact that its situs for garnishment differs from its situs for taxation. Jurisdiction over the debtor is
enough to subject the debt to attachment. 2 Jurisdiction over the
debtor is not enough to subject the debt to taxation. 3 Jurisdiction
over the creditor is enough for taxation" and not enough for
garnishment.' The situs of a debt for garnishment may move
about from day to day as the debtor migrates. The situs for taxation stays at the domicil of the creditor however far he wanders
from his own fire-side. No general statement about the situs of
a debt is likely to be true. There is a situs for garnishment and a
different situs for taxation. These differences exist because duly
authorized judicial tribunals make them exist. They are so because courts say they are so. Situs and the absence of situs are
both fabricated products. To understand their composition we
should inquire into the process of their manufacture. Our present
inquiry is confined to a peculiar kind of situs for taxation, known
as business situs; and the manufacturer with whose product we
are primarily concerned is the Supreme Court of the United States.
The first Supreme Court decision on the subject of business
sitits is New Orleans v. Stempe5 decided on December 4, 1899.
Here a New York guardian of a New York ward objected to being
2 Chicago, Rock Island etc. R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797 (1899);
Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1904).
State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (1872) as approved with modification in Buck -v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 408, 27 Sup. Ct 712 (1907).
4 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v.
Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40 (1917) ; Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 40Sup. Ct. 417 (1920) ; Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U. S. 325, 40
Sup. Ct. 558 (1920).
Obviously the chose in action cannot be reduced to possession unless there it
power to seize the debtor or some of his belongings. I have not come across anbe
case where garnishment was attempted elsewhere than where there was power over
the debtor.
6 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110 (1899).
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taxed by Louisiana on a deposit in a New Orleans bank and on
notes "largely secured by mortgages on real estate in New Orleans ' ' 7 which "notes and mortgages were in the city of New
Orleans, in possession of an agent of the plaintiff, who collected
the interest and principal as it became due and deposited the
same in a bank in New Orleans to the credit of the plaintiff.""
It is to be assumed that the debtors were domiciled in Louisiana,
but the opinion of the court gives no hint that this was deemed
of any importance. The two other possible bases for the Louisiana
tax were the conduct, of business in the state through an agent and
the presence of the notes and mortgages in the state.9 The former
appears as the ground on which the statute sought to reach these
credits;1O the latter seems to be the justification found by the
Supreme Court for permitting the tax.1' Indeed the case, standing by itself, might well be taken as authority for the proposition
that debts represented by notes and secured by mortgage have a
.situs where the notes and the mortgages have their physical presence. Yet, since the case was one in which the creditor ran a
loaning business through an agent within the taxing state, it may
be received in good society as an exponent of the theory of business
situs, after it has lost respectability as an effort to treat notes
and mortgages as chattels.
It seems to be only when he is considering whether these credits
are taxable under the Louisiana statute that Mr. Justice Brewer
adverts to the fact that a regular loaning business was done within
the state. He quotes that part of the statute which, after declaring
that credits and promissory notes shall be subject to taxation, says:
"And this shall apply with equal force to any person or
persons representing in this state business interests that may
claim a domicil elsewhere, the intent and purpose being that
no nonresident, either by himself or through any agent, shall
transact business here without paying to the state a corresponding tax with that exacted of its own citizens; and all
bills receivable, obligations, or credits arising from the business done in this state are hereby declared assessable within
this state, and at the business domicil of said nonresident,
his agent or representative.' 12
Ibid., 312.
SIbid.
The fact that the notes were secured by mortgage of Louisiana land which would
give Louisiana power to tax the creditor on his interest in Louisiana realty under the
doctrine of Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct.
292 (1898) was not made a basis for taxation by the Louisiana statute.
10 See quotation from the statute cited in note 12, infra.
" See quotations from the opinion cited in notes 27 and 28, infra.

175 U. S. 309, 313.
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The learned Justice then reviews the decisions of the Louisiana
court showing that this court excluded from the statute simple
debts not evidenced by any writing such as insurance premiums
due and unpaid" and a bank deposit, 14 but held taxable a bank
deposit which was the fruit of a continuing business conducted
by an agent within the state. 5 After this conspectus, Mr. Justice
Brewer declares:
"From this review of the decisions of the supreme court
of the state it is obvious that moneys, such as these referred
to, collected as interest dnd principal of notes, mortgages, and
other securities kept within the state and deposited in one of
the banks of the state for use or reinvestment, are taxable
under the act of 1890. They are property arising from business done in the state; they were tangible property when received by the agent of the plaintiffs, and, as such, subject to
taxation, and their taxability was not, as the court holds, lost
by their mere deposit in a bank. It is true that when deposited the moneys became the property of the bank, and for
most purposes the relation of debtor and creditor arose between
the bank and the depositor, yet as evidently the moneys were
to be kept in the state for reinvestment or other use they
remained still subject to taxation, according to the decision
in 49 La. Ann. 43. With regard to the notes and mortgages,
it may be conceded that there is no express decision of the
supreme court to the effect that they were taxable under the
law of 1890, yet the reasoning of that court in several cases
and its declarations, although perhaps only dicta, show that
clearly in its judgment they had a local situs within the state,
and were by the statute of 1890 subject to taxation." 6
Here seems to be a confusion of two or more ideas. The bank
deposit is the fruit of business transactions within the state and
it is a metamorphosis of something tangible. Not only is it the
23 Liverpool etc. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 760, 11 So. 91 (1892) ;
Railey v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 765, 11 So. 93 (1892). From the opinion
in the second case Mr. Justice Brewer quotes the following from page 770: "There
is no doubt of the legislative power to modify the rule of comity, Mobilia personam
sequuntur, in many respects. Moveables having an actual situs in the state may be
taxed there, though the owner be domiciled elsewhere. Even debts may assume such
concrete form in the evidences thereof that they may be similarly subjected when
such evidences are situated in the state, as in the case of bank notes, public securities,
and, possibly, of negotiable promissory notes, bills of exchange, or bonds.
"But as to mere ordinary debts, reduced to no such concrete forms, they are not
capable of acquiring any situs distinct from the domicil of the creditor, and no legislative power exists to change that situs so far as nonresident creditors are concerned.
As said by the Supreme Court of the United States: 'To call debts property of the
debtors is simply to misuse terms. All the property there can be in the nature of
things, in debts, belongs to the creditors to whom they are payable, and follows their
3omicil wherever that may be. Their debts can have no locality separate from the
parties to whom they are due.' State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300."
(175 U. S. 309, 313-314).
21 Clason v. New Orleans, 46 La. Ann. 1, 14 So. 306 (1894).
15 Blueflelds Banana Co. v. New Orleans Board of Assessors, 49 La. Ann. 43, 21
So.'3 627
U. S. 309, 316.
175 (1897).
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fruit of past business transactions but it is an implement of
present and future business transactions. The idea that the deposit is the reincarnation of something tangible formerly possessed
seems a trifle mystical; it is an idea equally applicable to any debt
due upon the sale of a chattel. At best it can be but a makeweight tossed on to a balance which the court was determined
to tip against the taxpayer.
For fuller justification for holding the notes to be within the
Louisiana statute, 'Mr. Justice Brewer goes outside of the Louisiana decisions. He is still professedly confining himself to the
interpretation of the Louisiana statute when he says:
"If we look to the decisions of other states we find the
frequent ruling that when an indebtedness has taken a concrete form and become evidenced by a note, bill, mortgage,
or other written instrument, and that written instrument
evidencing the indebtedness is left within the state in the
hands of an agent of the nonresident owner, to be by him
used for the purposes of collection and deposit or reinvest17
ment within the state, its taxable situs is within the state."
Some of the opinions in the cases reviewed seem to lay stress
on the fact that business is done within the taxing state,"8 while
others appear to content themselves with pointing out that the
scrap of paper is like a chattel, taxable where found." One of
them lays down explicitly that the property does not exist where
Tbb d .,3 17
'
S"we
are not only satisfied that this method of taxation is well founded in
principle and upon authority, but we think it entirely just and equitable, that, if
persons residing abroad bring their property and invest it in this state, for the
purpose of deriving profit from its use and employment here, and thus avail themselves of the benefits and advantages of our laws for the protection of their property,
their property should yield its due proportion towards the support of the government
which thus protects it."
Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152, 161 (1849), quoted in 175
U. S. 309, 317.
"If the owner is absent, but the credits are in fact here, in the hands of an agent,
for renewal or collection, with the view of reloaning the money by the agent as a
permanent business, they have a sifis here for the purpose of taxation, and there is
jurisdiction over the thing."
Goldart v. People ex. rel. Goar, 106 Ill. 25, 28 (1883),
quoted in 175 U. S. 309, 318.
the mansion and the money in the bank were, under
'g "That the furniture in
And
these provisions, properly assessable to the relators is not seriously disputed.
I am unable to see why the money due upon the land contracts must not be asThe debts due upon these contracts are personal estate,
sessed in the same way.
the same as if they were due upon notes or bonds; and such personal estate may
be said to exist where the obligations for payment are held. Notes, bonds, and other
contracts for the payment of money have always been regarded and treated in the
They are the
law as personal property. They represent the debts secured by them.
subject of larceny, and a transfer of them transfers the debt. If this kind of property
does not exist where the obligation is held, where does it exist? It certainly does not
And while, for some purposes
exist where the debtor may be, and follow his person.
in the law, by legal fiction, it follows the person of the creditor and exists where he
may be, yet it has been settled that for the purpose of taxation this legal fiction does
not, to the full extent, apply, and that such property belonging to a nonresident
creditor may be taxed in the place where the obligations are held by his agent."
People ex rel. Westbrook v. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 390, 397 (1872), quoted in 175
U. S. 309, 318-319.
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the debtor may be and follow his person. 20 Nowhere in the opinion
is there any evidence that jurisdiction over the debtor has any
relation to jurisdiction to tax his debt. The Stempel Case would
lead us to assume that, if the theory of business situs results in
allowing debts to be taxed in the jurisdiction where the debtor
resides, this is a mere coincidence.
When Mr. Justice Brewer passes from quotation and summary
of the opinions of state courts, he says nothing more about the
fact that these credits were business assets and a revolving fund
continually employed within the state. He takes pains to prove
that prior Supreme Court decisions do not insist that debts can
have no other situs than the domicil of the creditor. He says of
State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds"' that it is confined to a case
in which the bonds are in the possession of the creditor without
the covetous state, and "is not to be taken as a denial of the power
of the legislature to, establish an independent situs for bonds and
mortgages when those properties are not in the possession of the
owner. ' ' 2 2 He cites cases showing that corporate stock may have
its situs at the domicil of the corporation2 3 and that a debt secured
by a mortgage of land may be treated as an interest in the land
and taxable where the land lies. 24 He recognizes that in Kirtland
v. Hotckkiss2 5 "it was assumed that the situs of such intangible
property as a debt evidenced by a bond was at the domicil of the
owner, " 26 but he explains the case as one which merely enforced
a personal contribution measured by intangibles and which carried
no implication against a legislative rule that debts may get a situs
elsewhere than at the domicil of their owner. None of these decisions actually supports the decision which Mr. Justice Brewer was
in the process of reaching. All that can be said of them is that
they do not foreclose the possibility of what the court was about
to do. For positive precedents Mr. Justice Brewer must depend
on the state decisions which he adduced apparently for the sole
purpose of establishing that the tax before him was due under
the Louisiana statute.
Nowhere in the opinion is it distinctly stated that the case involved any constitutional issue. There is talk of situs, but no
mention of the Fourteenth Amendment. Technically the case
20 See passage quoted in note 19, supra.
Note 3, supra.
175 U. S. 309, 320.

Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall. 490 (1873).
24 Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, note 9, supra.
5 Note 4, supra.
: 175 U. S. 309, 321.
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may stand for no more than an interpretation of the statute,
federal jurisdiction apparently having obtained by reason of
diversity of citizenship. Yet Mr. Justice Brewer seems to have
the constitutional issue in mind in the concluding paragraphs
of his opinion. He refers to the fact that by statute bills and
notes are made subject to seizure and sale on execution just as
chattels are, and asserts that "it would seem to follow that the
state has power to establish a like situs within the state for purposes of taxation." 2 7 This is a non sequitur. A simple debt may
be garnisheed where the debtor is caught but it is not therefore
subject to taxation at the same place. It is elementary that situs
for attachment and situs for taxation are not necessarily identical.
But Mr. Justice Brewer insists on looking at a promissory note as
a chattel. We get the underlying reason for the decision in the
paragraph which immediately precedes the statement of the court's
conclusion. Here Mr. Justice Brewer assures us:
"It is well settled that bank bills and municipal bonds are
in such a concrete tangible form that they are subject to
taxation where found, irrespective of the domicil of the
owner; are subject to levy and sale on execution, and to
seizure and delivery under replevin; and yet they are but
promises to pay-evidences of existing indebtedness. Notes
and mortgages are of the same nature; and while they may
not have become so generally recognized as tangible personal
property, yet they have such a concrete form that we see no
reason why a state may not declare that if found within its
limits they shall be subject to taxation." 2 s
Such is the genesis of the doctrine of business situs of credits,
so far as the doctrine is that of the Supreme Court of the United
States. The significant thing is that it does not appear to be a
doctrine of business situs, except by a few reflections of the light
from decisions of state courts. The Supreme Court goes rather
on the notion that the property taxed is the piece of paper physically located in the taxing jurisdiction and thus having a situs
there like any other chattel so located. As Mr. Justice Moody
says of this decision and a later one2" on the same Louisiana
statute: "In both of these cases the written evidences of the
credit were continuously present in the state, and their presSIbid.,

322.

Ibid., 322-323.
State Assessors v,. Comptoir National D'Escompte, 191 U. S. 388, 24 Sup. Ct,

109 (1903).
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Mr.
ence was clearly the dominant factor in the decisions.""
Justice Holmes had earlier cited New Orleans v. Stempel1 for the
statement that courts "have been loath to recognize a distinction
for taxing purposes between what is called money in the bank
and actual coin in the pocket" and so "the practical similarity
more or less has obliterated the legal difference."32 Yet in Buck
v. Beach,3 3 decided in 1907, Mr. Justice Peckham puts the Stempel
Case on the ground that "the capital of the owner was thus invested in the state ' 3 4 and says that "the notes did not alter the
nature of the debt, but were merely evidence of it."'" What he
means by this becomes more apparent a little later when he says:
"There are no cases in this court where an assessment such
as the one before us has been involved. We have not had a
case where neither the party assessed nor the debtor was a
resident of or present in the state where the tax was imposed,
and where no business was done thereii by the owner of the
notes or his agent relating in any way to the capital evidenced
by the notes assessed for taxation. We cannot assent to the
doctrine that the mere presence of evidences of debt, such as
these notes, under the circumstances already stated, amounts
to the presence of property within the state for taxation.
That promissory notes may be the subject of larceny ... does
not make the debts evidenced by them properly liable to taxthe
ation within the state, where there is no other fact than
8
presence of the notes upon which to base the claim.' 3
These contradictory intimations show that the Supreme Court
has not been continuously clear in its collective mind as to just
what was the initial justification brought forward for taxing credits
elsewhere than at the domicil of the creditor. This mind was
divided in Buck v. Beach" from which quotation has just been
made. Mr. Justice Day in dissenting cited the Stempel Case along

'0

In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 400, 27 Sup.
Ct. 499 (1907).
im Note 6, supra.
2 In

Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 205, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903).

3 206 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct. 712 (1907).
Ibid., 404-405.
"

Ibid., 405.

Ibid., 406.

In Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct. 607 (1914), Mr.

Justice Holmes, with the connivance of Justices Day, Lurton and Hughes, tried to
explain Buck v. Beach as a case in which the notes were present only temporarily in
the state which sought to tax them. These four judges insisted that permanent pres-

ence of notes gives them a situs like that of a chattel both for inheritance taxation
and for property taxation. Justices McKenna and Pitney held that presence of the
notes is enough to justify an inheritance tax, but were careful to say that it is not
Mr. Justice McKenna made it very clear that
enough to justify a property tax.
neither Buck v. Beach nor any of the cases on business situs sanctioned a property
The
tax merely because of the physical presence of notes evidencing the obligations.

three dissenting justices agreed with Mr. Justice McKenna's analysis of Buck v. Beach,
so that on the most recent ballot, five justices voted against treating promissory notes

as chattels.
Note 33, supra.
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with others38 in support of the assertion that "this court in a
series of cases has held that notes, bonds, and mortgages may
acquire a situs at the place where they are held." 9 He insists
that in the Stempel Case "there was no fact of investment and
reinvestment of capital." 40 He notes that Mr. Justice Moody
had observed that the presence of the notes was clearly the dominant factor in that decision. Yet he agrees that the precise point
whether presence of the notes alone gives situs had not been actually decided in the previous cases. And before the quarrel in
Buck v. Beach4 ' there had been Supreme Court decisions allowing
the taxation of credits away from the domicil of the creditor even
though the evidences thereof were not retained in the taxing state.
Thus it was manifest that the Supreme Court, even if it had at
one time been of the opinion that presence of the notes is enough
to give a situs to the debts they represent, had also been of the
opinion that such obligations may acquire a business .situs without
the aid of the presence of the notes.
The first manifestation of this opinion appeared in Bristol v.
Washington County4" which was argued less than two months after
the filing of the opinion in the Stempel Case and was decided at the
same term of court. There a Minnesota agent ran a loaning business for a New York principal, retaining possession of the mortgages, but not of the notes. The notes were sent to Minnesota
only when necessary for renewal or collection or for foreclosure
of the mortgages. During the latter part of the period in question
the Minnesota agent had no power to discharge the mortgages.
After reciting these facts, Chief Justice Fuller declared:
3 Of the cases cited, two are on business situs:

Bristol v. Washington County, note

42 infra, and State Assessors -v. Comptoir National D'Escompte, note 45 infra. Both
these cases are later declared not to be based on the idea that the paper evidencing
the debt had a physical situs in

the taxing jurisdiction.

Liverpool etc. Ins. Co. V.

Board of Assessors, note 75 infra. Blackstone v. Miller, note 32, supra, another case

relied on by Mr. Justice Day to establish that notes are like chattels, did not involve
a note, but a simple bank deposit. Moreover, the case was later declared not to be
Carstairs v. Cochran,
application to property taxation.
See infra, pages 102-103.
193 U. S. 10, 24 Sup. Ct. 318 (1904), also cited by Mr. Justice Day, involved whiskey,
which formerly at least was not intangible. Scottish Union etc. Ins. Co. v. Bowland,
196 U. S. 611, 25 Sup. Ct. 345 (1905) involved bonds deposited with a state official
to secure the policy-holders within a state as required by statute. The opinion was
"A considerable part of the
by Mr. Justice Day who remarked at pages 619-620:
opinion of the court below and the discussion in the briefs of counsel goes to the
question of the power of the state to tax bonds, held as these were, within its jirlsdiction. At the oral argument, however, the learned counsel representing the insur-

ance company conceded that there was legislative power to impose the taxes in
question. A reference to the decisions of this court makes it perfectly plain that
Then follow citations of the businesssuch taxation is within the power of the state."
situs cases and the whiskey case. If the decision today represents the view of the
Supreme Court, it must be either because bonds are treated as different from ordinary
notes or because securities deposited under such a statute are thought of as having
a business situs, as is made clear by wheeler v. Sohmer, note 36, supra.

206 U. S. 392, 411.

4
u

Ibid.
Note 33. supra.
177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585 (1900).
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"Nevertheless the business of loaning money through the
agency in Minnesota was continued during all these years
just as it had been carried on before, and we agree with the
circuit court that the fact that the notes were sent to irs.
Bristol in New York, and the fact of the revocation of the
power of attorney did not exempt these investments from
taxation under the statutes as expounded in the decision to
which we have referred. And we are unable to perceive that
any rights secured by the Federal Constitution were infringed
as the situs of these
by the statutes as thus interpreted so .far
43
loans and mortgages was concerned."
Instead of giving a reason for regarding as of no importance
what seemed to be regarded as the dominating factor four months
earlier, the Chief Justice contents himself with repeating his assertion. With reference to the Stempel Case he says:
"There the money, notes, and evidences of credit were in
fact in Louisiana, though their owners resided elsewhere.
Still, under the circumstances of the case before us, we think,
as we have said, that the mere sending of the notes to New
York and the revocation of the power of attorney did not
take these investments out of the rule.
"Persons are not permitted to avail themselves for their own
benefit of the laws of a state in the conduct of business within
its limits, and then to escape their due contribution to the
public needs through action of this sort, whether taken for
convenience or by design.""
The second paragraph may have been designed as a reason.
It has the flavor of moral condemnation of the late Mrs. Bristol
for having the notes sent to her in New York instead of leaving
them in Minnesota. But if presence of the notes confers situs,
as Mr. Justice Brewer so unmistakably intimated in the Stempel
Case, there can be no more sin in sending the notes from one
jurisdiction to another and thus shifting their situs than there is
in changing one's domicil or in removing any chattel from one
state to another. What the Chief Justice is now saying is that
the basis of the situs of credits is the doing of business in the state
and not the presence of pieces of paper there.
Yet three years later, when the Louisiana statute again came
before the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Day works hard to sustain
a tax on the ground that the tangible evidence of credits was
physically within the jurisdiction. This was in State Board of
.Ibi,
143-144.
144.
.bi.,
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Assessors v. Comptoir National D 'Escompte4 which involved loans
apparently made by way of overdrafts. In effect, however, the
so-called check which the borrower drew against no funds and
gave to the lending bank was merely a memorandum of the amount
borrowed. Mr. Justice Day says that "the exact question is
whether these checks ... are evidence of credits ... having a local
situs in New Orleans, and constitutionally taxable within the
meaning of the Louisiana statute. "46 While enough is said about
the fact that the Comptoir was engaged in business in Louisiana
to warrant the assumption that the court thought such business
activity essential to the jurisdiction asserted by that state, the
dominant ground of the decision, as Mr. Justice Moody later reminds us,41 is the presence in the state of these so-called checks.
Mr. Justice Day returns to this idea when he sums up by saying:
"Applying these principles to the facts in the case, we have
no doubt that these checks, secured in the iVanner stated, and
given for the purpose of evidencing an interest-bearing debt,
were the evidences of credits for money loaned, localized in
Louisiana, protected by its laws, and properly taxable there. "18
By this time the Supreme Court had become unanimous. Yet
the opinion doubtless represents the pet attitude of the judge who
wrote it-an attitude which those of differing mind did not bother
to combat so long as they agreed with the result reached. Mr. Justice
Day and Mr. Justice Brewer were the two dissentients in Buck v.
BeacO49 in which they insisted unsuccessfully that the presence of
notes in a state is alone sufficient to subject them to taxation there2 °
This idea was here denied by their seven colleagues, though when
these two justices had stressed the same idea earlier in the Stempel
Case and in Bristol v. Washington County,51 their colleagues had
been content to keep still so long as they could find other grounds
on which the same result might stand. Justices Harlan and White
had dissented in the Stempel Case, presumably because they
191 U. S. 388, 24 Sup. Ct. 109 (1903), note 29, supra.
Ibid., 401.
," In addition to the full description of the method by which the loans were made
and evidenced, there is the following summary of the law induded from previous
decisions:
"From these cases it may be taken as the settled law of this court that
there is no inhibition in the federal Constitution against the right of the state to tax
property in the shape of credits, where the same are evidenced by notes or obligations
held within the state, in the hands of an agent of the owner for the purpose of collection or renewal, with a view to new loans and carrying on such transactions as a

permanent business."

191 U. S. 388, 403-404.

191 U. S. 388, 404.
Note 33, supra.
10 See note 36, supra, for the Supreme Court's later attitude as to what was decided
in Buck v. Beach.
"4

"

Note 42, supra.
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thought that neither the running of a loaning business nor the
presence of the notes nor both combined conferred jurisdiction to
tax. Mr. Justice White concurred in Bristol v. Washington
County52 "on the ground of stare decisis only." 3 He might have
drawn the distinction that in the first case the notes were permanently in the taxing state while in the second they were not.
His failure to do so indicates the possibility that in the Stempel
Case the idea that a note was like a chattel was not such a favorite
with the court as a whole as with the writer of the opinion.
In these early opinions the court appears to have been feeling
its way. It didn't dare drop completely the idea that there was
something tangible either located in the taxing state or in some
physical or fanciful fashion having its headquarters there, as an
individual has his "technically pre-eminent headquarters""5 in
some place which thereby becomes his domicil even though he
spends most or all of his time somewhere else. The same idea
persists to a degree in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans,
decided in 1907, where loans to Louisiana policy holders of a New
York insurance company were held taxable in Louisiana, although
the notes and the policies securing them were kept in the home
office in New York. They were sent to the New Orleans agent to
deliver to the makers when they were paid, but it did not appear
whether or not they went to New Orleans to have the interest
payments indorsed on their backs. Mr. Justice Moody persuades
himself that somehow or other these continued to be Louisiana
notes. As he puts it:
"The notes and securities were in Louisiana whenever the
business exigencies required them to be there. Their removal
with the intent that they shall return whenever needed, theirlong-continued though not permanent absence, cannot havethe effect of releasing them as the representatives of investments in business in the state from its taxing power. The law
may well regard the place of their origin, to which they inten4
to return, as their true home, and leave out of account temporary absences, however long continued." 8
Somewhat enigmatically the learned Justice adds that "neither
the fiction that personal property follows the domicil of its owner,
2 Ibid.
177 U. S. 133, 149.

5,

4 Mr. Justice Holmes in Williamson v. osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 625, 34 Sup. CL
442 (1907).
56 205 U .S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499 (1907).
I!bid., 402.
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nor the doctrine that credits evidenced by bonds or notes may
have the situs of the latter, can be allowed to obscure the truth.'"
For this he cites Blackstone v. Miller s which four years earlier had
allowed New York to impose an inheritance tax on the transfer of
a deposit in a New York bank made by an Illinois decedent. Thus
"the truth" might seem to be that a debt has its situs at the domicil
of the debtor, for in Blackstone v. Miller"5 Mr. Justice Holmes had
asserted that "power over the person of the debtor confers jurisdiction. "0 Yet in the very next paragraph Mr. Justice Holmes
went on to say that the views he was expressing in no way conflicted with the point decided in State Tax on Foreign-HeldBonds,61
for there the bonds were held out of the taxing state and "bonds and
negotiable instruments are more than merely evidences of debt,"'
since "the debt is inseparable from the paper which declares and
constitutes it, by a tradition which comes down from more archaic
conditions." ' 63 Thus if Blackstone v. Miller"4 had any possible
application to a property tax, it clearly did not imply that when
notes were in one jurisdiction the "truth" was that the obligation
was in another. Moreover, before the Metropolitan Case was decided, the court had already heard the argument in Buck v. Beacht5
in which two months later Mr. Justice Peckham put Blackstone v.
Miller 6 to one side by saying that cases on inheritance taxes are
not apposite to property taxes.61 At the same time he affirmed
that with the exception of taxes on the interest of a mortgagee in
the mortgaged premises, the principle upon which State Tax on
Foreign-HeldBonds"5 was decided "has not been otherwise shaken
by the later cases."" 9 Thus instead of a judicially revealed truth
that a debt has its situs where the debtor is, we have a judicially
revealed truth that jurisdiction over the debtor does not in and
of itself give jurisdiction to tax the debt.
'Ibid.

188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903).
Ibid.

Ibid., 206.
Note' 3, supra.
188 U. S. 189, 206.
Ibid.

Note 58, supra.
Note 33, supra.
Note 58, supra.
,' "Cases arising under collateral inheritance tax or succession tax acts have been
cited as affording foundation for the right to tax as herein asserted. The foundation
upon which such acts rest is different from that which exists where the assessment Is
levied on property. The succession or inheritance tax Is not a tax on property, as has
frequently been held by this court (Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, and Blackstone
v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189), and therefore the decisions arising under such inheritance
tax cases are not in point." 206 U. S. 392, 408. Notwithstanding this explicit assertion, other Justices of the Supreme Court from time to time cite inheritance tax
cases as though they applied of their own force to property taxes.
' Note 3, supra.
206 U. S. 392. 408.
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What truth then is it that Mr. Justice Moody will not explicitly
expose but will not have obscured? Perhaps it is what was in
his mind a moment earlier when he found the controlling consideration in Bristol v. Washington County,0 to be "the presence
in the state of the capital employed in the business of lending
money."171 Mr. Justice Moody seems to think that somehow or
other the capital loaned to the Minnesota farmers had a real
presence in Minnesota as property of the lender, although both
lender and notes were in New York. This presence seems to be
due to the succession of acts and negotiations which take place
in the debtor state. Combination and repetition seem to create
a presence that cannot come from an isolated loan and mortgage.
For in the Metropolitan Case Mr. Justice Moody is careful to say:
"We are not dealing here merely with a single credit or a
series of separate credits, but with a business. The insurance
company chose to enter into the business of lending money
within the state of Louisiana, and employed a local agent to
conduct that business. It was conducted under the laws of
the state. The state undertook to tax the capital employed
in the business precisely as it taxed the capital of its own
citizens in like situation. For the purpose of arriving at the
amount of capital actually employed, it caused the credits
arising out of the business to be assessed. We think the state
had the power to do this, and that the foreigner doing business cannot escape taxation upon his capital by removing
temporarily from the state evidences of credits in the form
they have their taxable
of notes. Under such circumstances
72
situs in the state of their origin."
Here is jurisdiction over the debt, not because of the presence
of the debtor, not because of the presence of any security given
for the debt, not because any single debt was negotiated within the
state, but because an agent was running a recurrent loaning business within the state.
That such a business would be subject to an excise tax admits
of no dispute. Such an excise tax might be measured by the face
value of all the loans negotiated during the year or by the amount
outstanding at any given time. But how the capital from which
the loans come can have in the state any presence which capital
making but a single loan would lack is nowhere made clear. All
that the Metropolitan Insurance Company had in New Orleans
Note 42. supra.
nL205 U. S. 395, 402.
12 Ibid., 402-403.
10
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was an agent and some debtors. Its capital thus allocated to
New Orleans is nothing but some obligations due from New
Orleans debtors plus some power on the part of a New Orleans
agent to deal with the debtors as to their borrowing and paying.
Such collective capital was no more physically present in New
Orleans than any single intangible was present there or anywhere.
The faint aroma of the idea that the notes themselves had some
lingering physical connection with their place of origin may be
neglected as equally fanciful. The basis of the Louisiana tax
must be either the domicil of the debtor or the running-a loaning
business within the state or the combination of the two.
That the domicil of the debtor is not alone enough to justify
the tax is established by the reaffirmation of State Tax on ForeignHeld Bonds.7 ' Would the doing of business be alone enough to
justify the tax? This can not be definitely answered from the
Supreme Court decisions. In all the Supreme Court cases in
which the doctrine of business situs has been applied, the taxing
state has been the domicil of the debtors as well as the place where
the business was conducted. In Buck v. Beach74 the exemption
was put on the ground that the mere presence of the notes in
Indiana did not give them a situs there and this was said to be
the sole question before the court. The notes were secured by
mortgage of Ohio lands and were presumably the obligations of
Ohio makers. The Indiana agent seems to have been a nonfeasant
secreting bailee and not a negotiator. The ease therefore does not
decide that the debts due from Ohio borrowers could not have
had a situs in Indiana if the transactions with regard to their
creation, continuation and extinction took place in Indiana. Until
such a case arises, there must be some uncertainty as to how the
Supreme Court will decide it. Nevertheless there is not a little
reason to suspect that the court might not discover a business situs
unless the domicil of the debtor as well as the conduct of business
is within the taxing jurisdiction.
The basis for this suspicion is the emphasis placed by Mr. Justice Hughes in Liverpool etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors75 on
the fact that the taxing state was the domicil of the debtor. This
case like most of its ancestors involved a New Orleans tax on a
foreign insurance company. The credits here taxed were not
loans by the company to the policy-holders but were amounts owing
"
'

Note 3, supra.
Note 33, supra.
221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550 (1911).
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from the policy-holders for over-due premiums. The debts were
not evidenced by any notes, so that here was a case where the idea
that the tax was on notes as a species of chattels could find no
foothold.
I was easy to establish from the prior cases that notes given
for debts need not remain in the state of their origin in order
to let fhat state tax the credits and that a check given as a memorandum would do as well as a formal note. But it was still
urged that Louisiana could not tax credits which were not evidenced by any writing at all. As counsel put it: "The legislature has not the power to localize an abstract credit away from
the domicil of the creditor."16 To this, Mr. Justice Hughes replied:
"The asserted distinction cannot be maintained. When it
is said that intangible property, such as credits on open
account, have their situs at the creditor's domicil, the metaphor
does not aid. Being incorporeal, they can have no actual
situs. But they constitute property; as such they must ba
regarded as taxable, and the question is one of jurisdiction.
"The legal fiction expressed in the maxim mobilia sequuntur
personam yields to the fact of actual control elsewhere. And
in the case of credits, though intangible, arising as did those
in the present instance, the control adequate to confer jurisdiction may be found in the sovereignty of the debtor's
domicil. The debt, of course, is not property in the hands
of the debtor; but it is an obligation of the debtor, and is of
value to the creditor, because he may be compelled to pay;
and power over the debtor at his domicil is control of the
ordinary means of enforcement. Blackstone v. Miller, 188
U. S. pp. 205, 206. Tested by the criteria afforded by the
authorities we have cited, Louisiana must be deemed to have
had jurisdiction to impose the tax. The credits would have
had no existence save for the permission of Louisiana; they
issued from the business transacted under her sanction within
her borders; the sums were payable by persons domiciled
within the state, and there the rights of the creditor were to
be enforced. If locality, in the sense of subjection to sovereign
power could be attributed to these credits, they could be
localized there. If, as property, they could
77 be deemed to be
taxable at all, they could be taxed there."
Here twice Mr. Justice Hughes makes the point that the taxing
state was the domicil of the debtor. Since, as we have seen, this
alone would not be enough to authorize that state to levy a property
Ibid., 354.
SIbid., 354-355.
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tax, it seems strange that Mir. Justice Hughes lays so much stress
on it unless it has an importance in conjunction with the running
of a loaning business within the jurisdiction that it does not have
alone. He refers to it again a little later when he says:
"But, as we have seen, the jurisdiction of the state of his
domicil, over the creditor's person, does not exclude the power
of another state in which he transacts his business, to lay a
tax upon the credits there accruing to him against resident
debtors, and thus to enforce contribution for the support of
under whose protection his affairs are conthe government
78

ducted."

The decision is certainly confined by the opinion to a tax on
amounts due from resident debtors. It is also confined to such
obligations as arise from a more or less continuous course of
transactions within the state. Mr. Justice Hughes speaks of credits
"arising as did those in the present instance;" he says that "they
would have had no existence save for the permission of Louisiana,"
and that "they issued from the business transacted under her
sanction within her borders." In Orient Insurance Co. v. Board
of Assessors, 79 decided at the same time, the contention that the
sums due for premiums were debts of the agents and not of the
policy holders prompted the answer:
"If, however, it can be said that these accounts were due
from the agents, still this would not avail the plaintiffs. The
premiums were the consideration for the insurance contracts;
they were the returns from the local business. Charging the
premiums to the local agents did not withdraw the credits
accruing to the corporations in the business transacted within
the state from its taxing power."8°
Thus we see that we may select passages from Supreme Court
opinions which indicate that the important element in business
situs is the doing of business within the state and other passages
which lean hardest on the fact that the debtors are domiciled
within the state. But we know that domicil of the debtor is not
of itself sufficient to justify the taxation of the debt. Therefore
we are certain that to have a business situs of credits, the credits
must be the product of a business within the jurisdiction. We
have reason to surmise that the Supreme Court may insist that
this business must be one with borrowers or other debtors domiciled
in the jurisdiction where the business is carried on. Yet it is
T' Ibid., 256.
It 221 U. S. 358, 31 Sup. Ct 554 (1911).
Ibid., 359-360.
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possible that a court may emphasize the importance of the domieil
of the debtor when that helps to justify the tax and may yet find
sufficient other justification when a loaning business has dealings
with extra-state borrowers. The difficulty of prophesying is enhanced by the fact that the judges of the Supreme Court have
seldom agreed with each other on the issues of the taxation of
intangibles away from the domicil of their owner. The various
opinions would make a multi-colored coat for Jacob. To disagreement about what ought to be the rules and the limits of the rules
is added disagreement about what previous cases really stand for.
If the Supreme Court is unable to agree as to just what it has
decided it is not strange that others may have doubts on points
here and there. Since the decisions thus far have been reached
by the path of policy and not by the path of logic, it takes a
mind-reader and not a logician to know what the decisions of the
future will be. The path of policy twists and turns in ways
difficult if not impossible to foresee. At present we must still
be curious whether the Supreme Court will assign a business situs
to credits at the place where they are negotiated with non-resident
borrowers. We must also be uncertain as to just how much business must be done in order to localize debts at the place of their
creation. Will ten debts do or does it take twenty? And will debts
arising from a sufficient business always remain taxable at their
birthplace or will they lose their business situs as soon as the
business ceases?
A court which is called upon to answer these questions may
do well to start with a recognition that a money lender who
establishes a local facility for his operations is in competition with
local banks. His enterprise is one that may be declared to be a
privilege subject to license restrictions8 1 and one that may be
required to be conducted in corporate form.8 2 The fact that any
such enterpriser is a non-resident who makes use of resident individuals instead of a domestic corporation ought not to save him
from any taxes that local banks must bear. Such banks may be
taxed on the capital employed or on the income derived from that
employment whether their borrowers are within or without the
state. When by localizing the management of his capital a nonresident individual behaves just as a local bank behaves, he too
should be subject to taxation on that capital or the income thereEngel v. O'Malley. 219 U. S. 128, 31 Sup. Ct. 190 (1911).
Shallenberger v. First National Bank of Holstein, 219 U. S. 114, 31 Sup. Ct. 189
(1911).
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from without regard to any other situs or locus than the situs or
locus of the management of his undertaking. Credits acquire what
is called a business situs only when they are the tools of business
,operations. While the taxes on such credits which we have been
considering have been property taxes, the justification for their
application has been the fact that the credits instead of being
isolated and quiescent were in a sense companions in activity.
Since the acquisition of a business situs is conditioned on such
interrelated activities, it may be urged that in fixing the detailed
requirements and qualifications of such a situs we should look
to the canons of fairness and policy to be found in the principles
established for the taxation of business rather than to those in the
principles peculiarly applicable to the taxation of persons or of
property quite apart from any employment in business. If this
idea meets with favor, the domicil of the debtors loses all sigmificance, and the place where the business is conducted becomes
the controlling factor.
To these same canons of business taxation we may look for
guidance in settling the minor matters in the requisites of business situs-whether the business must be continuous and continuing and what must be its volume. An excise may be imposed
-on the making of a single loan through a domesticated agency,
and this excise may be measured by the amount of the loan.
Whether the single transaction may be subjected to repeated an-nual excises so long as the loan remains unpaid is at best doubtful.
An insurance company which solicits no new business within a
state but merely continues existing policies on the lives of residents,
collecting the premiums at its extra-state office, is immune from
a license tax. 83 So it would seem that no excise may be imposed
on outstanding loans after an extra-state lender has withdrawn
all authority from a local agent. Some continuing authority of
the local agent would be requisite to repeated excises and so may
well be held requisite to the continuance of business situs. If this
continuing authority includes power to make new loans as well
as to collect old ones a state may probably levy an excise measured
by the capital involved in both enterprises. This seems a fair inference from the established power of a state to impose on an
insurance company writing new business an excise measured by
-premiums paid on lives within the state without regard to the
9 Provident Life Assurance Society v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 34
(1915).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol28/iss2/2

20

Powell: The Business Situs of Credits
BUSINESS SITUS OF CREDITS

place of payment, whether within or without the state. 4 Premiums
which escape assessment if no new business is done are caught
if business is continued. So on the principles of excise taxation
we may contend that the business situs of all credits outstanding
continues so long as the local agents retain power to sow as well
as to reap. Where these agents lose power to make new loans and
retain only the authority to collect outstanding balances, a more
difficult question arises. They would be subject to an excise on
their collecting activities which might be measured by the amounts
that they gather in. Possibly such an excise might be measured
by the capital which they hold themselves out to gather in, since
courts are far from fussy as to the assessment of excise taxes when
it is certain that an excise may be levied. The particular capital
represented by the outstanding loans is as much localized in the
state as it ever was, so long as local agents retain power to collect
those loans. Even if this capital would not be a proper measure for
the assessment of an annual recurring excise on the enterprise of
employing it in business within the state, it might justifiably be
held liable to a property tax on the theory that its previously
acquired situs continued so long as the local management over it
continued even though the local management over other capital
had ceased. On the whole our intermediate case of continuing
power to collect outstanding loans after loss of power to make new
ones seems to satisfy the requirements of fairness in continuing
a business situs even if power of local agents to make collections
would not be enough to confer an initial business situs on loans
originally negotiated without the state.8"
Whatever official answer is given to these subordinate questions,
it is to be hoped that the reasons therefor will not proceed on the
assumption that the inquiry is whether the debt as property is
within or without the state. Such a question has no substance
except as it acquires it from the answer authoritatively given to it.
The real issue is whether it is fair to all the parties concerned to
" Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 143, 35 Gup. Ct 829
(1915).
8 In Fidelity etc. Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40 (1917),
in which a citizen of Kentucky was held taxable by Kentucky on a bank deposit in a
Missouri bank, Mr. Justice Holmes conceded for the purpose of the decision that
the deposit would be taxable in Missouri. It was the fruit of Missouri business
transactions but represented profits no longer used In the Missouri business. From
this we may infer that credits which are the product of business continue to have a
business situs in the state of origin so long as business continues even though the
particular credits are withdrawn from the business. The propriety of the inference
is, however, weakened by the fact that the statement Is dictum and expressly confined
to the purposes of the case in which the issue was a wholly different one, and also by
the fact that Mr. Justice Holmes has in other opinions Interpreted previous cases as
going further in favor of the taxing state than a majority of his colleagues have
been willing to concede.
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allow a state to extract revenue from a loaning business conducted
within its territory. There would be no doubt of an affirmative
answer if it were not for the fact that the capital employed in this
business or the income therefrom must contribute their quotas to
the state in which the owner and recipient is domiciled. It seems
tough to make him pay twice when he would pay only once if his
activities were confined to his own state. On the other hand it
seems tough on the state which fosters the productivity of his
capital to deny it the power to reap revenue therefrom. On the
issues raised by such conflicting considerations the judgment of
Solomon would seem to possess the peculiar wisdom for which
that lawmaker was noted. Unfortunately our law is not equipped
to order the partitions and divisions that a wise despot might
find appropriate. So it makes various compromises. It allows
land and chattels to be taxed where they are and not where they
are not. It allows the ordinary simple obligation to pay to be
taxed where the obligee owes allegiance but not where the obligor
chooses to dwell. Obligations of a peculiar character or created
in peculiar ways may often be taxed twice, since the Supreme
Court has not seen fit to extend to intangibles the rule applied
to tangibles which makes immunity from taxation at the domicil
of the owner the correlative of liability to taxation elsewhere.
The severity of this refusal is mitigated somewhat by the success
with which the persons interested escape from paying what may
lawfully be demanded. Yet a system which is fair only to the
dishonest and the crafty has not much to commend it. As a;
result the general property tax as applied to intangibles has pretty
much broken dovn. In its place we are substituting the classified
property tax, which lures intangibles from their hiding places by
offering to treat them with moderation, and the income tax which
in effect reaches the same result in the same way, since the rate
on income seldom takes such heavy toll as the rate on capital. At
the same time the operation of income tax laws bids fair to increase bi-state double taxation. The Supreme Court allows income
to be taxed in the state in which it is earned and in the state in
which the recipient resides. Thus it is more expensive for persons
to reap reward from a distance than from their own home town.
With respect to money loaned at interest the borrower will be
likely to pay the freight. This may in time induce the several
states to adjust their systems to conform to the judgment of Solomon
even though not required to do so by the lesser wisdom of the
Constitution as revealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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